THE CLEAN WATER ACT:
AN ECONOMIST’s APPRAISAL
A. Myrick Freeman III*
Bowdoin College, and Resources for the Future, Inc.

Introduction
The water in our lakes, rivers, and
streams supports a wide range of uses. Water can
be withdrawn for drinking and other domestic
uses, for industrial processes, or for irrigation. It
can support fish populations that are the basis of
commercial exploitation and recreational fishing.
It can be used for boating and swimming, and it
can be used to flush away the wastes from
factories and municipal sewers. Most of these
uses are to varying degrees dependent on the
quality of the water. Yet the use of a water body
as a waste receptor can seriously degrade water
quality and impair or even preclude other uses.
A Ralph Nader task force report, “Water
Wasteland,” published in 1971, helped to dramatize the poor state of some of our water bodies.
At least in part in response to that report,
Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1972. This law was revised in
1977 and again in 1987 and is now known as the
Clean Water Act (CWA).
In this paper I describe the key features of
the CWA, review what is known about what has
actually been accomplished in controlling discharges and in improving the quality of our nation’s waters, and present an economic
assessment of water pollution control policy.

The Law

The law established two primary objectives. The first is the elimination of all discharges
of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985. The
second calls for attaining “fishable and swimmable” waters by 1983. The principal means for
achieving these objectives are the establishment
and enforcement of technology-based effluent
standards. These standards are quantitative limits
imposed on all dischargers where the quantities
are based on the present technology. To put it
simply, standards are set based on what can be
done with available technology rather than what
should be done to achieve ambient water quality
standards, to balance benefits and costs, or to
satisfy any other criterion. Since production
processes, quantities and composition of waste
loads, and treatment technologies vary
substantially across industries, separate discharge
standards must be developed for different
industries. These standards are referred to as
“effluent limitations.”
Effluent limitations become the basis for
discharge permits to be held by all dischargers.
These permits limit the allowable discharges of
the individual polluters to the quantities that are
consistent with the relevant technology-based
effluent limitation. Permits were initially to be
issued through the regional offices of EPA. If a
state agency satisfies certain conditions, however,
it can take over responsibility for issuing permits
and enforcing their terms.

*This paper is adapted from my contribution to Paul R. Portney (ed.)
Public Policies for Environmental Protection. Washington: Resources
for the Future. Readers interested in a more detailed treatment of these
topics and a full set of references should consult this source.

The CWA also includes significant
provisions dealing with non-point sources of
pollution and providing financial assistance to
municipalities for construction of municipal
sewage treatment systems. But space limitations
preclude any discussion of these issues.
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and if so, by how much. None of the available
data can answer this question conclusively; but
we can draw some inferences from several sets
of data. These data are of two types: predications
of changes in water quality in response to
changes in discharges based on water quality
models that hold other things, such as the level
of economic activity, constant and observations
of actual changes in water quality.

Accomplishments

It has been estimated that as of 1977,
about 80 percent of industrial dischargers
complied with their effluent limitations and that
by 1981, 96 percent of these sources would be in
compliance. The compliance rate for municipal
dischargers was substantially lower. It has also
been estimated that this level of compliance by
industry would result in an approximately 65
Researchers at Resources for the Future
percent reduction in industrial discharges of
oxygen demanding organic material and an 80 (RFF) have made a major effort at modelling the
effects of the 1972 law on several measures of
percent reduction in suspended solids.
water quality. The RFF water quality network
The term “compliance” as used by EPA model is based on inventories of waste generated
generally means the installation of treatment at point sources and estimates of actual removal
equipment capable of meeting the effluent rates as of 1972. The inventories of wastes
limitations when properly operated. These data do generated and discharged are combined with a
not say anything about actual discharges. To model of pollution transportation to predict
determine the degree of effective compliance, it is values for four water quality parameters at over
necessary to examine the discharges of polluters 1,000 locations in the continental U.S. Estimates
and to compare them with the terms of their of increased treatment levels because of the law
permits and relevant effluent limitations.
can be used to predict changes in discharges and,
hence, water quality measures across the
The U.S. General Accounting Office
country.
(GAO) attempted to do this for an 18 month
period in 1981- 82. The GAO had to rely on
The study examined two scenarios. The
discharge data supplied by the dischargers rather first was based on the estimated actual 1972 disthan independent measures; thus the degree of charges of polluting substances and predicts the
effective compliance may be overstated. percentage of locations achieving assumed water
Nevertheless, the GAO study indicated a quality standards. About 83 percent of all
significant noncompliance problem. They locations was predicted to have been meeting the
examined the discharge data for about a third of standard for dissolved oxygen in 1972. Also, in
all industrial and municipal dischargers in six this scenario relatively few locations were
states. Eighty-two percent of the sources had at predicted to have attained the assumed standard
least one month of noncompliance during the 18 for phosphorus and nitrogen.
month period. Moreover, about 24 percent of the
In the second scenario, the model
sample was in “significant noncompliance” with
predicted
water quality at each location assuming
at least four consecutive months during which dischargers exceeded permitted levels by at least 50 all point sources of pollution to be in compliance
percent. The performance of municipal sources with the relevant effluent limitation. The model
was poorer than that of industrial sources, and this predicted increases in the number of locations
was especially true in the case of significant non- meeting the standards for each of the four water
quality parameters; but the absolute and
compliance.
percentage increases are surprisingly small. The
It is important to try to determine whether model predicted only a 6 percent increase in the
the CWA has resulted in levels of water quality number of locations satisfying the dissolved
across the country that are better than they would oxygen standard. But this is in large part because
have been, other things equal, without these laws, of the high percentage of loca14

tions already meeting the standard. On the other
hand for those two parameters where there is
greatest room for improvement, phosphorus and
nitrogen, the law has a relatively small effect on
the number of locations in violation. This is
because the point sources affected by the law are
relatively unimportant sources of these pollutants.
In summary, to the extent that this model
accurately predicts water quality, it appears that
the CWA has had relatively little affect on water
quality in many areas.

phosphorus and suspended sediments, the
percentage of stations showing improvements
(11% and 14% respectively) were approximately
equal to the percentages showing declines (13%
and 13% respectively). Stations showing
increasing trends in nitrates outnumbered those
showing decreases by 4.5 to one. The authors
attribute this largely to increases in fertilized
agricultural acreage and to atmospheric
deposition of nitrates in eastern watersheds.

Economic Issues

Measures of water quality such as dissolved oxygen or total phosphorus may not have
much meaning to most people. What matters
most to them is how changes in such measures
affect various uses of the water body. One such
use of rivers and lakes is recreational fishing. To
the extent that reduced pollution results in more
recreation opportunities and higher quality
recreation, fishermen are made better off.
Researchers at RFF have developed a method for
classifying water bodies by the quality of fishing
opportunities they present and for translating
changes in water quality as predicted by the RFF
water quality network model into changes in the
availability of water for various categories of
fishing.

From an economic perspective, not all
interventions in behalf of environmental
protection are desirable per se. Some may cost
more than they are worth — not only in terms of
private market values but also in terms of
individual and social welfare. Governmental
intervention to control pollution is justified on
grounds of economic efficiency if the beneficial
effects (broadly defined) to society as a whole
from such action outweigh the costs.
Examinations of costs and beneficial effects
should become an integral part of the process of
establishing pollution control objectives.
Unfortunately, there have been no
studies of the aggregate national benefits of the
CWA that deal in a fully satisfactory manner
with all phases of the relationship between
policy induced reductions in pollution and the
values of improved uses of our waters. Lacking
any fully satisfactory national aggregate benefit
estimates, the analyst who wishes to make a
benefit-cost comparison for the CWA must do so
through some kind of synthesis and extrapolation
from the most soundly based of existing studies.

Using the estimates of actual discharges
in 1972, the model predicted that only 4.2% of
the waters covered by the model fell into the
unfishable category in 1972. The implementation
of the CWA was predicted to increase the total
fishable area by only 0.35%. The major benefit of
the law came from improving the quality of
fishing in already fishable areas.
These results from modelling exercises
are consistent with actual observations of water
quality and the analysis of water quality
monitoring data. One comprehensive analysis of
trends in a large number of water quality
measures covered the period 1974-198 1. Stations
showing improvements in bacteria and dissolved
oxygen levels outnumbered stations showing
declines (substantially in the case of bacteria); but
fewer than 20% of the stations showed
improvements in these measures. As for

I prepared such an estimate of national
benefits for the Council of Environmental
Quality in 1979. It was based on a review of
approximately twenty empirical
studies.
Estimates of benefits were provided for four
broad categories: recreation, nonuser benefits
stemming from aesthetic and ecological changes,
improved productivity of commercial fisheries,
and a variety of diversionary uses including
municipal and industrial water supplies.
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The national benefits to the U.S. population in
1985 were estimated to be at least $5.7 billion per
year (in 1984 dollars), although they could be as
high as $27.7 billion per year. The most likely
value is $14.0 billion per year. Of this total, about
half is due to improvements in water-based recreation opportunities.
Based on data from the Council on Environmental Quality and the Environmental Protection Agency, a reasonable estimate of the annual
costs of complying with the CWA for the year
1985 is roughly $25-30 billion (in 1984 dollars).
This is substantially higher than the most likely
estimate of the benefits to be realized in 1985. In
fact, the range of the estimates for benefits ($5.727.7 billion) barely overlaps the bottom end of the
estimated range for costs. On balance, therefore, it
appears that the benefit-cost relationship for the
CWA is unfavorable.
This suggests that it is important to seek
ways that present policies could be modified to
improve the benefit- cost relationship. Broadly
speaking, there are two such avenues to be investigated.
The first involves lowering targets or pollution control requirements where, at the margin,
the costs of current controls substantially exceed
the benefits. If we were to adopt the principle that
policies should be designed to maximize the net
benefits from pollution control activities, then
effluent limitations on individual dischargers
would emerge as the result of a two-part analytical
process. The first part would involve the
establishment of a set of water quality standards
for each water body so that the incremental or
marginal benefits of raising water quality to that
point just equal the marginal costs of doing so. In
those cases where marginal pollution control costs
were high, the resulting water quality standards
might be lower than the fishable-swimmable
national target. But in other cases this economic
benefit-cost approach might lead to very high
standards for water quality.
The second part would then involve determining the individual effluent limitations necessary to meet the water quality standards for each
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water body. These requirements might vary
across dischargers not only because of
differences in industrial processes and control
technologies but also because of differences in
costs and impacts on water quality. This
approach to policy making could save resources
by imposing fewer stringent effluent limitations
where the marginal costs of achieving fishableswimmable water quality were greater than the
marginal benefits of doing so.
The second avenue involves seeking
ways of reducing the costs of achieving the
existing goals, that is, by improving the costeffectiveness of pollution control policy. By
cost-effectiveness economists mean meeting
water quality standards at the lowest possible
total cost. The importance of achieving costeffective pollution control policies should be self
evident. Any cost savings that can be achieved
frees resources that can be used to produce other
goods and services of value to people. If some
change in the allocation of cleanup requirements
among dischargers results in a lower total cost of
controlling pollution without degrading water
quality, then society is clearly better off.
A pollution control policy is costeffective only if it allocates the responsibility for
cleanup among sources so that the marginal cost
of improving water quality at any location is the
same for all sources. Differences in the marginal
costs of improving water quality can arise both
from variations in the marginal cost of reducing
discharges across sources and from differences
among sources in the effect of discharges on
water quality.
A major criticism of technology-based
standards from an economic standpoint is that
they are virtually certain to result in higher than
necessary total costs for any particular level of
water quality. There is nothing in the logic or the
procedures for setting technology-based limits to
assure that the conditions for cost minimization
will be satisfied. Since the marginal cost of
control is not systematically considered,
technology-based standards are not likely to
result in equal marginal costs across

sources. There is ample evidence that marginal amount of a pollutant discharged from the plant
costs of control do vary widely across sources does not exceed the aggregate of the effluent
now.
limitations for individual processes. EPA is now
allowing such bubble tradeoffs at integrated steel
There are several modifications of present mills if the tradeoffs result in a net reduction of
policy that would go a long way toward the total amount of pollutants discharged. Present
improving its cost-effectiveness. The one most law should be modified as necessary to facilitate
favored by economists in the past has been to similar intraplant trades in all industrial
place a tax or charge on each unit of each categories.
pollutant discharged and to allow each discharger
to choose the degree of cleanup that minimizes its Conclusions
total cost (cleanup cost plus tax bill). The effluent
Three major themes can be traced through
charge strategy provides a certain and graduated
incentive to firms by making pollution itself a this discussion of water pollution control policy.
cost of production. And it provides an incentive They are: the importance of comparing benefits
for innovation and technological change in and costs, the value of seeking more costpollution control. A properly designed system of effective control programs, and the potential role
effluent charges will also be cost-effective for economic incentives such as charges or
because all sources will equate their marginal marketable discharge permits.
costs of control with the charge.
Another approach with essentially the
same incentive and cost minimizing effects is a
system of tradeable or marketable discharge
permits. The pollution control agency could issue
a limited number of pollution permits or
“tickets.” Each ticket would entitle its owner to
discharge one unit of pollution during a specified
period. The agency could either distribute the
tickets free of charge to polluters on some basis
or auction them off to the highest bidders.
Dischargers could also buy and sell permits
among themselves.

We saw that in aggregate it appears that
the costs of the present policy substantially
outweigh the benefits. Yet if the goal of fishableswimmable water quality is to be met
everywhere, even more costs will have to be
incurred, If it is accepted that the resources
presently devoted to water pollution control are
scarce, involve opportunity costs, and may have
more valuable uses in other activities, then a
reconsideration of some water quality goals may
be in order. This may mean accepting less than
fishable-swimmable quality water where the costs
of obtaining it are inordinately high.

A small step toward obtaining the economic advantages of tradeable discharge permits
is the application of the “bubble” concept to
water pollution control. In a major industrial
facility such as an integrated steel mill there may
be several separate activities or processes, each
subject to a different effluent limitation. Many of
these activities discharge the same substance. Yet
the marginal costs of control may be quite
different across activities. As a result, the total
cost of controlling the aggregate discharge from
the plant is often higher than necessary. In such
cases, plant managers should be allowed to adjust
treatment levels on different activities if they can
lower total treatment costs as long as the total

We have argued that one way to improve
the benefit-cost relationship of the existing policy
is to seek more cost- effective means of achieving
given standards. The emphasis on equal treatment
of dischargers or uniformity of cleanup requirements has meant that the cost of reaching present
water quality objectives are substantially higher
than necessary. This means fewer of society’s
resources are available for other valuable uses.
More emphasis should be given to the
development of cost-effective means of achieving
targets. We have discussed the potential role of
charges or marketable discharge permits in
moving toward a more cost-effective pollution
control policy.
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Finally, progress toward attaining water
pollution control objectives has been slow. Timetables have not been kept, and deadlines have
been reached and passed without full
compliance with the legislated objectives. These
shortfalls in implementation are due in
substantial part to the complexities of the task.
But a major share of the responsibility for the
slow pace of progress must be assigned to the
inappropriate incentive structures created by the

regulatory approach to pollution control.
There are many opportunities for restructuring
incentives through marketable discharge permits
or effluent charges.
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